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Abstract 
Unlike most other sciences, psychology has no true core theory to guide a coherent 
research programme. It does have James J Gibson’s ecological approach to visual per-
ception, however, which we suggest should serve as an example of the benefits a good 
theory brings to psychological research. Here we focus on an example of how the eco-
logical approach has served as a guide to discovery, shaping and constraining a recent 
hypothesis about how humans perform coordinated rhythmic movements (Bingham 
2004a, b). Early experiments on this task were framed in a dynamic pattern approach. 
This phenomenological, behavioural framework (e.g. Jeka & Kelso 1989) classifies the 
behaviour of complex action systems in terms of the key order parameters, and de-
scribes the dynamical stability of the system as it responds to perturbations. Dynami-
cal systems, however, while a valuable toolkit, is not a theory of behaviour, and this 
style of research is unable to successfully predict data it is not explicitly designed to fit. 
More recent work by Bingham & colleagues has used dynamical systems to formalise 
hypotheses derived from Gibson’s ecological approach to perception and action, with a 
particular emphasis on perceptual information. The resulting model (Bingham 2001, 
2004a, b; Snapp-Childs et al. 2011) has had great success with both the phenomena it 
was designed to explain as well as a wide range of empirical results from a version of 
the task it is not specifically designed to explain (specifically, learning a novel coordi-
nation). This model and the research programme that produced it stand as an example 
of the value of theory driven research, and we use it to illustrate the contemporary 
importance the ecological approach has for psychology. 
Keywords:  Gibson;  Bingham;  ecological  psychology;  theory;  coordinated  rhythmic 
movement.  
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When particle physicists recently found that some neutrinos had apparently travelled 
faster than light (Adams et al. 2011) it never actually occurred to them that this is what 
had happened. On the basis of the extraordinarily well supported theory of relativity, 
the physics community went ‘that's weird - I wonder what we did wrong?’, and pro-
ceeded to use that theory to generate hypotheses they could then test. It would take a 
lot of fast neutrinos to disprove relativity, and even though the result turned out to be 
caused by a faulty cable, the robust response by physicists stands as an example of the 
benefits of a good theory.  
Similarly, the core of modern biology is the theory of evolution. When creationists say 
‘we can’t see how a bacterial flagellum which rotates like an outboard motor could 
possibly have evolved, it’s irreducibly complex’ (e.g. Dembski 2002), biologists are en-
titled to say ‘we have evidence that lots and lots of other things have evolved. Let’s see 
if we can figure out how the flagellum did it, and in the meantime, we’re going to op-
erate on the assumption that it did evolve until we have strong evidence to the con-
trary’. The resulting theory driven empirical work then happily led to a coherent evo-
lutionary story for the flagellum (e.g. Musgrave 2004).  
Psychology has many individual theories describing isolated phenomena but no core 
theory of behaviour to guide our research, no analogue to the theories of relativity or 
evolution. This is beginning to cost the discipline. Recently Bem (2011) published a 
series of experiments purporting to demonstrate evidence of precognition. Bem took 
several standard psychological experiments and reversed the temporal ordering of the 
elements. Analyses showed a series of statistically significant effects that suggested 
that events in the near future were affecting earlier performance. For example, he 
showed participants a list of words then tested their free recall. After this test, he 
trained the participants on a subset of the words, and showed that there was improved 
recall of those words, even though the training had come last. Because he followed the 
rules of experimental design and had statistically significant results, the Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology was unable to find a reason to reject the paper. The 
editors only noted that “the reported findings conflict with our own beliefs about cau-
sality and that we find them extremely puzzling” (Judd & Gawronski 2011: 406, em-
phasis ours).  Note that the cited conflict was with their beliefs about causality, and 
not, for example, the laws of physics and what they have to say about time travel. This 
should have been an opportunity for Bem to discuss problems with the standard me-
thods and analyses that produced these physically impossible results (the approach 
taken in a companion paper by Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom & van der Maas 
2011). Instead, his discussion was framed in terms of a loose reading of quantum phys-
ics and an appeal to psychologists to keep an open mind. The paper simply described 
what had happened, without any real attempt to explain how it had happened. A fail-
ure to replicate Bem’s key effects has recently been published (Ritchie, Wiseman & 
French 2012), but this paper was also entirely empirical and descriptive in nature, 
with no reference to any underlying theory of how the world works.  
Psychology needs a core theory in order to mature as a science. Theory serves a dual 
role in science. It allows the scientist to identify when a result is likely to be anomaly 
(e.g. faster-than-light neutrinos), and, more critically, it provides a guide to discovery to A Remedy called Affordance 
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structure the search for explanations of novel phenomena (e.g. the bacterial flagel-
lum). The Bem experiments demonstrate how, without a theory, psychology is unable 
to deal rigorously with anomalous results. This paper will discuss how an example 
psychological theory (James J. Gibson’s ecological approach to visual perception; Gibson 
1966; 1979) has been able to guide discovery and explanation of new phenomena, spe-
cifically how people learn to produce a novel coordinated rhythmic movement. It has 
been able to do this because it is a theory of both the objects of perception and the 
ecological information that supports that perception. The theory can therefore be used 
to propose specific mechanisms to explain a given behaviour, rather than simply pro-
viding some terms to describe that behaviour. We will suggest that the successes of this 
approach in the area of perceptually guided action stands as a clear model of what a 
truly theory-driven psychology could achieve. 
 
The ecological approach – a brief review of some key points 
Gibson famously begins his 1979 book on visual perception with an extended analysis 
of the environment organisms inhabit, rather than the more traditional starting point 
of the anatomy of the eye. The reason is simple: Gibson knows that in order to under-
stand why the anatomy of the eye is the way it is, we need to first understand what 
kinds of properties it has evolved to detect. The traditional analyses note that the eye 
works similarly to a camera, with a lens that focuses light (presumably an image) up-
side down onto a pixelated retina that varies wildly in resolution and which contains 
an enormous blind spot. The analysis then takes this poor quality image as the basis of 
visual perception and begins to investigate the internal (representational) structures 
that are now required to enrich the image to a point where it can support the rich 
phenomenology of visual experience (e.g. Marr 1982; Rock 1985). Gibson’s first power-
ful move is simply to recognise that the eye is not the starting point of the analysis. 
Eyes evolved under selective pressure to enable access to information in the environ-
ment that could support action and guide behaviour. The question then becomes, what 
is that information, and what is it about? 
This move pays off immediately. If the function of vision is to support action, then vi-
sion must provide us with access to information about action relevant properties of 
the world. Organisms don’t need to know how far away an object is; instead, we need 
to know whether we can reach it, and if so can we grasp it (e.g. Mon-Williams & Bing-
ham 2011); or perhaps we need to know whether it is approaching us on an intercep-
tion path, and if so do we have enough time to respond by evading or intercepting the 
object (e.g. Tresilian 1999). We therefore need to know about properties of objects 
measured according to our ability to act with respect to those properties, and how the 
current layout of properties is varying over time. Gibson coined the term affordances 
to describe the organism-scaled action relevant properties of the environment,
24 and 
changes in the layout of the organism’s environment are ecological events.  
                                                             
24 There is something of a debate in the literature about whether affordances are dispositional properties of 
the environment (Turvey 1992; Turvey, Shaw, Reed & Mace 1981) or whether they are relational properties 
of the animal-environment system (Chemero 2003, 2009; Stoffregan 2000, 2003). We favour the dispositional AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Defining these ecological properties of the world is relatively straight-forward: Gibson 
then notes that ‘‘The central question for the theory of affordances is not whether they 
exist and are real, but whether information is available in the ambient light for per-
ceiving them’’ (Gibson 1979: 140). Gibson’s theory therefore suggests that the prime 
goal of any empirical investigation should be identifying the perceptual information 
that supports access to world properties (affordances and events) and his analysis of 
the nature of the information available to a visually perceiving organism, ecological 
optics, provides clear guidelines on what that information can look like
25.  
Gibson’s analysis of the environment identifies two key facts. First, the basis for vision 
is not light, per se, but structure in light. The clearest demonstration of this is the 
Ganzfeld experiments, in which an observer is presented with plenty of light in an 
entirely homogeneous light field and perceives nothing at all (Gibson & Dibble, 1952; 
Metzger, 1930). This is the situation faced by an observer in white-out conditions dur-
ing a blizzard; there is plenty of light energy, but there is no structure, and thus noth-
ing  is  perceived,  often  with  disastrous consequences.  However,  light that has  inte-
racted with a surface contains structure that reflects (pun intended) that interaction 
and can therefore carry information about the surface. Gibson calls this structured 
light the optic array and identifying the contents of this array is the main focus of eco-
logical psychology research. 
Second, organisms are always moving throughout the environment. This motion pro-
vides us with a constantly changing sample of the optic array, and, more importantly, 
the changes are not random. Instead, the structure in the array will transform smooth-
ly and in ways specific to the relation between the organism and the ecological proper-
ties of the world that caused the structure. Higher order relational structure in this 
optic flow, which is caused by these world properties, can remain invariant over the 
transformation, and these invariants are specific to the properties that caused them. 
These invariant features are therefore specifying information about affordances and 
events, and an organism that can detect the information is directly perceiving ecologi-
cally  relevant  properties  of the  world  (Bingham 1995;  Turvey,  Shaw, Reed  &  Mace 
1981).  
The ecological approach serves contemporary psychology and cognitive science in two 
ways. First, while Gibson’s theory is not a complete theory of behaviour, it is an excel-
lent foundation for one, because it provides a detailed account of how we perceive the 
environment that changes how we treat perception. Direct perception of affordance 
properties changes the job description for any cognitive, post-perceptual processes, 
from inference about the source of the information to using that information to coor-
dinate and control skilled action. If you have direct access to action relevant proper-
                                                                                                                                                                              
account, but the difference is not crucial for the current discussion; in both cases affordances are considered 
to be real and capable of creating information. 
25  Ecological  optics  has  since  been  refined  into  the  theory  of  kinematic  specification  of  dynamics  (e.g. 
Runeson & Frykholm 1983). Properties of the world are defined dynamically, in terms of both their motions 
(kinematics) and the forces that caused those motions (kinetics). Perception has access only to kinematic 
information (this is the perceptual bottleneck; Bingham 1988) but this is capable of specifying dynamical 
properties.  A Remedy called Affordance 
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ties such as affordances, for example, there is no need for any internal process that 
infers the existence of the affordance from a more limited set of perceptual informa-
tion. In other words, any theory about behaviours that depend on perception (i.e. all 
of them) should work out what Gibsonian perception has already done to allow the 
behaviour to emerge before placing all the responsibility in the central nervous sys-
tem. In this way, the ecological approach should be treated as the starting point for 
any theory of behaviour. In particular, embodied cognition researchers are beginning 
to realise that if cognition is a system which spans body, brain and environment (e.g. 
Clark 2008) we need a way for information to flow through this system in order to 
softly  assemble  (temporarily  couple)  the  task  relevant  components.  The  ecological 
approach has many of the relevant tools already in place (specifically, methods for 
identifying the relevant perceptual information and how action systems use this in-
formation to coordinate functional responses to a given task; Bingham 1988) and is 
therefore  already  ideally  placed  to  support  extended,  embodied  cognition  (Barrett 
2011).  Chemero  (2009)  has  comprehensively  covered  what  a  cognitive  science 
grounded in the ecological approach would look like in his recent book. Some minor 
quibbles aside, we endorse his view and so won’t rehash it here. 
The second contribution of Gibson’s theory (and the focus of this article) is how it 
stands as an  example  of  what  a  theory driven  research  programme  in psychology 
looks like and is capable of. Specifically, the theory serves as a guide to discovery, ca-
pable of driving forward an empirical research programme by asking the right ques-
tions and constraining what counts as a legitimate answer. Instead of simply summa-
rising  and describing  what  happened  in  an  experiment (as  is  common  throughout 
cognitive psychology), the ecological approach postulates a theory about the nature of 
perceptual information and what it means that enables researchers to explain their 
results and make novel predictions that go beyond the current data. In the next sec-
tion, we will review a recent programme of empirical work on the identity of the in-
formation  specifying  the  relative  phase  between  two  coordinated  rhythmic  move-
ments. This work, led by Geoff Bingham in concert with a variety of collaborators, has 
culminated in a perception-action model of the task in which, for the first time, a spe-
cific  hypothesis  about  information  features  prominently  (Bingham  2001,  2004a,  b; 
Snapp-Childs, Wilson & Bingham 2011). The model, and the strategy for assembling it 
stands as an exemplar of how the ecological approach can guide research and it clear-
ly demonstrates the benefits of a theory driven approach to psychology. We will con-
trast this approach with the phenomenological (descriptive) dynamic pattern approach 
(Kelso 1995; Zanone & Kelso 1994) which focused on simply describing key experimen-
tal results and remains unable to make successful predictions about novel experimen-
tal procedures.  
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Perception, action and coordinated rhythmic movement 
Coordinated rhythmic movement has been a staple of the perception-action literature 
since the basic task characteristics were described by Kelso (1981; see Kelso 1995 for a 
detailed overview). The core task is simple: take your two index fingers and move 
them up and down so that they do the same thing at the same time; this is 0° mean 
relative phase and is easy to produce and maintain over a wide range of frequencies. 
Now make your fingers alternate; this is 180° mean relative phase, and is also easy to 
produce and maintain, though over a smaller range of frequencies; at 3-4Hz, under a 
‘non-interference’ instruction, 180° becomes unstable and people typically transition 
into 0°. Other coordinations (especially the intermediate 90° rhythm) are typically un-
stable without training and people cannot maintain them in the face of perturbations 
such as an increase in frequency.  
These phenomena were described by the famous Haken-Kelso-Bunz model (Haken, 
Kelso & Bunz 1985). The model implements a dynamic pattern approach to coordina-
tion  phenomena.  It  models  an  abstract  dynamical  process  rather  than  the  task  of 
coordinating two limbs in particular, and the form of the model (two superimposed 
cosine functions) therefore makes no particular reference to anything about coordina-
tion other than being organised with respect to relative phase. Specifically, the two 
cosine functions describe an energy potential function; this function has local minima 
at 0° and 180°, with the minimum at 180° being shallower and wider. These minima 
represent  attractors,  locations  within  the  model’s  state  space  that  draw  behaviour 
towards themselves, while 90° is represented as an energy maximum, i.e. the energy 
required to maintain the state is maximal and thus it is unstable. This basic form of 
the model describes the intrinsic dynamics of the system, the preferred state. These 
dynamics can be altered, however, with learning. In the dynamic pattern approach, 
learning  is  described  as  a  phase  transition,  in  which  an  imposed  environmental 
rhythm (e.g. 90°) is incorporated into the intrinsic dynamics as a third attractor (e.g. 
Schöner & Kelso 1988; Zanone & Kelso 1992, 1997). This happens after a period of 
competition  for dynamical  resources  between the  intrinsic and  imposed attractors, 
and the phase transition is the resolution of this competition via a reorganisation of 
the system as a whole.  
The research strategy advocated by Kelso is behavioural and dynamical (e.g. Jeka & 
Kelso 1989). Researchers should identify the order parameters of a system along which 
behaviour is organised (here, relative phase) and determine the nature of the dynam-
ics by investigating the stability of the system in response to perturbations such as 
frequency scaling and the imposition of a to-be-learned rhythm. Experiments taking 
this  approach  have  identified  critical  stability  fluctuations  as  frequency  increases, 
fluctuations which abruptly decrease after a phase transition from, say, 180° to 0°, as 
well  has  phase  resetting  and  an  inverse  frequency-amplitude  relation  (Kay,  Kelso, 
Saltzman & Schöner 1987; Kay, Saltzman & Kelso 1991).  
Overall these results suggest that coordinated rhythmic movements are an example of 
an autonomous non-linear dynamical system. However, the HKB model and this mod-
elling strategy are entirely phenomenological: the equation is abstract and designed 
solely to fit the basic pattern of the data. There is no account of the origin of the attrac-A Remedy called Affordance 
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tors; if behaviour is organised with respect to relative phase, why are 0° and 180° so 
easy? Why is 90° maximally difficult? In effect, Kelso’s approach provides a clear un-
derstanding of how rhythmic movement is organised in people, but has no account of 
why it should be this way. This weakness revealed itself when the approach was ap-
plied to a phenomenon it wasn’t specifically designed to explain: trained performance 
at relative phases other than 90°. 
 
Learning (the dynamic pattern approach) 
The dynamic pattern approach considers learning to be a process of competition over 
limited dynamical resources between the intrinsic task dynamics (the HKB model) and 
extrinsic task demands (an externally paced rhythm). Zanone and Kelso (1994) laid out 
several predictions about how this competition should unfold when learning various 
novel coordinations. Learning something close to 0° (e.g. 45°) would be more difficult 
than learning something an equal distance from 180° (e.g. 135°) because the attractor 
at 0° would exert a stronger pull on this unstable state and prevent people from being 
able to maintain it.  
This has been tested twice, by Fontaine, Lee & Swinnen (1997) and Wenderoth, Bock & 
Krohn (2002). Both studies trained participants to perform novel coordinated rhyth-
mic movements that varied in their distance from the two intrinsically stable states 
(e.g. 36°, 45° 60°). Contrary to the prediction, learning a novel coordination close to 0° 
was easier (faster and more stable) than learning one close to 180°. Competition from 
pre-existing attractors does not explain this, but Wenderoth et al suggested that some 
earlier work from Bingham’s lab (Zaal, Bingham & Schmidt, 2000) on the visual per-
ception of relative phase contained the answer. 0° is not stable because there is an 
attractor there; rather, 0° can be described as having an attractor there because it is 
stable, and that stability is a function of how relative phase is visually perceived. In-
formation, not dynamics, held out the possibility of an explanation. 
 
The perceptual basis of coordinated rhythmic movements 
Schmidt,  Carello  &  Turvey  (1990)  demonstrated  that  the  HKB  phenomena  are  still 
present when the limbs being coordinated belong to different people and the coupling 
is  visual.  Bingham  then  ran a  series  of  visual judgment  experiments,  in  which  he 
asked participants to visually evaluate displays of dots moving at some mean relative 
phase with varying frequency and amounts of variability in the coordination (Bing-
ham,  Schmidt  &  Zaal  1999;  Bingham,  Zaal,  Schull  &  Collins  2001;  Zaal,  Bingham  & 
Schmidt 2000). The results were quite startling. Participants could do the task on aver-
age but the variability of their judgments varied in the HKB pattern (low variability at 
0°,  maximum  variability  at  90°  and  intermediate  variability at  180°).  Thus,  0°  was 
judged to be maximally stable, 180° stable but less so, and 90° maximally unstable 
even with no added noise; when phase variability was explicitly added, this was only 
clearly  discriminated  at  0°,  somewhat  at  180°,  and  not  at  all  at  90°.  Bingham  had 
shown that the HKB pattern from the movement task also showed up in a purely per-AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ceptual task, suggesting that the pattern in the movement task was being caused by 
how relative phase is perceived. Wilson, Bingham & Craig (2003) then replicated this 
result using haptic perception of relative phase.  
Following on from this, Wilson, Collins & Bingham (2005a) had people move at 0°, 90° 
or 180° in order to produce 0°, 90° or 180°, in varying combinations. In the conditions 
where the mapping was not altered (e.g. moving at 0° to see 0°, or at 90° to see 90°) we 
saw the HKB pattern. In the transformed mapping conditions, however, movement 
stability followed the visual feedback. Movements at 90° and 180° were both stabilised 
if the display showed 0°, while movements at 0° were made less stable if the display 
showed 90° or 180°. The stability of coordinated rhythmic movements followed the 
perception of relative phase, and not the relative phase of the movement per se (see 
also Bogaerts, Buekers, Zaal & Swinnen 2003). 
Relative phase is clearly perceivable. The question is how; what is the information for 
relative phase? There were hints in the literature that relative phase was perceived in 
terms  of  the  relative  direction  of  motion.  Relative  direction  perfectly  predicts  the 
movement phenomena; it is maximally stable at 0°, stable but less so at 180° and max-
imally variable at 90°. In addition, the HKB pattern goes away when relative direction 
is not defined (e.g. orthogonal movements: Wilson, Collins & Bingham 2005b; Wim-
mers, Beek & van Wieringen 1992; transformed (Lissajous) feedback: Kovacs, Bucha-
nan & Shea 2009a, b). Gibson made sure to emphasise, however, that it is always an 
empirical question which information people use. Wilson and Bingham (2008) syste-
matically and selectively perturbed all the components of motion that could conceiva-
bly specify relative phase (relative speed, relative frequency and relative position). 
None of the perturbations had any effect other than to add a small amount of noise to 
judgments of 0° and 180°. In addition, it proved impossible to perturb relative direc-
tion without making the relative phase undefined. We therefore concluded that rela-
tive phase is perceived in terms of the relative direction of motion.  
 
A perception-action model of coordinated rhythmic movement 
Bingham had now established that the movement phenomena reflect the perception of 
relative phase. However, remember that skilled actions are perception-action systems 
–  perception  is  not  the  entire  game  (as  erroneously  claimed  by  Mechsner,  Kerzel, 
Knoblich & Prinz 2001). Bingham therefore needed to model the full perception-action 
task in a manner that accurately reflected the actual composition and organisation of 
the task dynamic. Bingham’s intention was that this model should reflect the ecologi-
cal approach that had guided the discovery of the identity of the task elements. The 
model could not simply contain parameters designed to fit the data; everything in the 
model should represent an empirically identified element of the task dynamic of coor-
dinated rhythmic movement.  
The first step was a task analysis to identify the dynamical resources that were availa-
ble to be softly assembled into a task-specific device that produces the observed beha-
viour (Bingham 1988). This analysis revealed that we need to model two rhythmically 
moving limbs which are coupled together via perceived relative phase. Rhythmically A Remedy called Affordance 
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moving limbs exhibit very specific properties; they show limit cycle stability (their pre-
ferred state is periodic), phase resetting (they respond to perturbations such as being 
sped up or slowed down by returning to the limit cycle at a different phase than if they 
had  remained  unperturbed),  an  inverse  frequency/amplitude  relation  (as  frequency 
increases  amplitude  goes  down  unless  instructed  otherwise)  and  a  direct  frequen-
cy/velocity relation (Kay, Kelso, Saltzman & Schöner 1987; Kay, Saltzman & Kelso 1991). 
These characteristics mean that the control of the limbs is non-linear and autonomous 
(i.e. they are driven as a function of their own behaviour, not of time). Bingham there-
fore modelled the limbs to-be-coupled as damped mass-springs (following the equili-
brium point hypothesis, e.g. Feldman, Adamovich, Ostry, & Flanagan 1990).  
Perception enters the model in the coupling function. Each mass-spring is driven by 
the perceived phase of the other limb, modified by the perception of relative phase (in 
terms of relative direction) and with noise proportional to the relative speed (Wilson 
et al. 2005b; Snapp-Childs et al. 2011). Relative direction and relative speed are both 
state variables and thus can be used to drive a mass-spring autonomously; they are 
also both kinematic and thus perceivable (Bingham 1988; Runeson & Frykholm 1983; 
Turvey et al. 1981). The final form of the model (Bingham 2001, 2004a, b) is therefore 
 
 
where   
This model is the first fully perception/action model of coordinated rhythmic move-
ment. It explicitly models both perceptual and action components as having specific 
forms, and it places these components in a specific organisation with respect to each 
other. It also makes three specific predictions, all empirically confirmed; that the in-
formation for relative phase is relative direction (Wilson & Bingham 2008), that the 
movement phenomena are a function of perceptual stability (Wilson, Snapp-Childs & 
Bingham 2010) and that relative speed acts as a noise term (Snapp-Childs et al. 2011). 
 
The model as guide to future discovery – learning (the ecological approach) 
Like the HKB (and any decent cognitive model) Bingham’s model is very successful in 
explaining the things it is designed to explain. However, it has an extra dimension that 
the HKB lacks. Specifically, it is the product of a theory-driven process which uniquely 
demands that the model be built from components that have been empirically deter-
mined to matter, and that these components must be built so as to reflect the real 
composition and organisation of the system at hand. The model does not yet explicitly 
handle trained performance at, say, 90°; however, recent learning research inspired 
and guided by the ecological theory the model embodies has met with great success.  
The model assumes that movement stability is a function of perceptual ability. This 
suggests that if people became expert perceivers of 90°, they should then be able to 
move at 90° with no practice at the task. This is indeed the case (Wilson et al. 2010a). AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The model also suggests that learning 90° is unlikely to involve simply improving your 
ability to detect relative direction at 90°; this variable remains intrinsically variable at 
90° and thus cannot support stable action there. The model therefore suggests that 
people trained at 90° are likely to switch to a new variable; Experiment 2 of Wilson & 
Bingham (2008) perturbed the performance of the trained observers and found that 
they had switched to perceiving relative phase as relative position (but only at 90°). 
Finally, as noted above, Wenderoth et al. (2002) explained their learning rate data in 
terms of Bingham’s perception hypothesis; if the region around 0° is clearly perceived 
then different states there can be clearly discriminated and learning these states is 
therefore easier than around 180°. 
The model also predicts that there should be transfer of learning between bimanual 
and unimanual versions of the task because while the coupling in the unimanual case 
is only in one direction, it is still composed of relative motion information (Snapp-
Childs et al. 2011). This is indeed the case; there is transfer, and the form of the trans-
fer matches the predicted stability characteristics of the unimanual and bimanual ver-
sions of the task (Snapp-Childs, Wilson & Bingham, submitted). This is quite remarka-
ble; predicting how learning will transfer is a notoriously difficult problem in motor 
control (Schmidt & Young 1987). The ecological approach the model embodies, with its 
emphasis on information, makes clear and so far successful predictions about a task it 
is not explicitly set up to handle because it can base these predictions on a hypothesis 
about the underlying mechanism. 
 
Summary 
Sciences need theories, to guide discovery and constrain explanation. Gibson’s ecolog-
ical approach has shown itself capable of supporting productive and successful empir-
ical research across a wide range of tasks and serves as a model for what a theory-
driven psychology could achieve. Reviews of other work in this vein can be found in 
Barrett (2011) and Chemero (2009). We have focused here on Bingham’s perception-
action model as an exemplar of this research and how the ecological theory underpin-
ning the model successfully guided discovery and ruled out alternative explanations 
for phenomena. In addition, while the ecological approach is not a complete theory of 
behaviour, it is a successful theory of perception, and this must therefore be the start-
ing point of any analysis of behaviour. By beginning that analysis at the right place (in 
the opportunities for behaviour in the environment and the information about those 
opportunities) the ecological approach will inform, enrich and (most importantly) con-
strain our explanations of behaviour in a principled manner (Chemero 2009).  
Gibson’s ecological approach therefore continues to have much to offer contemporary 
psychology, but it remains to be seen if psychologists can accept and work within the 
constraints of a real theory as they attempt to explain more complex cognition and 
behaviour. The beauty of such a period of theoretically motivated, hypothesis driven 
‘normal’  psychological  science  is  that  if  we  invest  some  serious  time  pushing  the 
theory, looking for cracks, and resisting the temptation to jump ship at the first sign of 
trouble, psychology will end up in a better place no matter how it pans out. If the A Remedy called Affordance 
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theory breaks, it will have been broken honestly, and for good reasons. If the theory 
holds up, we will have achieved a lot of progress and begun to act like a real science 
for a change. Either way, psychology will be a stronger science for the experience. 
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